Opt-out choice framing attenuates gender differences in the decision to compete in the laboratory and in the field

In a system where applicants had to opt out of competition, women were more likely to compete. 

Experiment 1

• There were no gender differences in task performance.
• Within an opt-in system, women were less likely to choose to compete than men (47% vs. 72%) – a 25% gender gap in the absence of gender-based performance differences.
• Within an opt-out system, women and men were equally likely to compete (75% vs. 76%) – making competition the default eliminated the gender gap. 
• This opt-out “nudging” to encourage women to compete did not result in negative consequences on performance or well-being, as measured by reported anxiety, although women reported higher levels of anxiety than men in both the opt-in and opt-out conditions.

Experiment 2

• There were no gender differences in task performance.
• Within an opt-in system, women were less likely to compete than men (53% vs. 72%).
• Within an opt-out system, women and men were equally likely to compete (74% vs. 78%). 
• This increase in women’s participation in competition did not result in negative consequences on performance or well-being, as measured by reported anxiety.
• A post-experimental survey asking participants to report their perceived norms of competition and perceived desirability of competition found opt-out framing signaled significantly stronger norms to enroll. 

Experiment 3

• There were no gender differences in task performance. 
• Within an opt-in system, women were less likely to compete than men (53% vs. 73%).
• Within an opt-out system, the gender gap among women and men choosing to compete was not significant (67% vs. 72%). 
• Opt-out framing altered women’s “sensitivity” to negative performance signals (the number of data entry attempts in part 1 of the test project and the choice to apply to the advanced task in the third stage). Whereas in the opt-in condition women who had fewer attempted data entries were less likely to apply to the advanced task than men with the same performance signal, in the opt-out condition, a negative performance signal in stage 1 no longer deterred women from applying to the advanced task when participation was the default.
• Women who chose to apply to the advanced task improved in performance from stage 1 to stage 2 more than men, especially in the opt-out condition.

Due to the competitiveness inherent in the workplace, these findings imply that organizations can close the gender gap for various types of competitions in organizations by instituting opt-out systems and making competition the default, thus taking advantage of a broader talent pool. A practical application focusing on “fixing the system” rather than “fixing the women” or “fixing biases in the mind” would be to create a default where those who pass a performance and qualification threshold are automatically considered for (with the option to opt out of) promotions, participation in start-up pitch competitions, and innovation or creativity contests. Rather than targeting a specific group, this more inclusive structural intervention removes biases built into opt-in promotion systems which favor those who are overconfident and less sensitive to signals of their own performance, and/or who like to compete, which could also lead to positive spillover effects for other underrepresented groups.
 

In the first experiment, 482 undergraduate Canadian students (55% female) completed three stages of a timed math task. Compensation for the first stage was non-competitive with a piece rate of $0.50 for each correct answer. For the second stage, compensation was determined by a competitive tournament against three other participants where the winner received $2.00 per correct answer or $0 otherwise. For the third stage, participants randomly assigned to the opt-in system were automatically enrolled in non-competitive compensation but had the option to opt in to competitive compensation. Participants randomly assigned to the opt-out system were automatically enrolled in competitive compensation but had the option to opt out to non-competitive compensation. In the fourth stage, participants were given the choice to resubmit their stage one performance for either piece-rate compensation or a tournament compensation. Afterwards, participants guessed their relative rank in the first and second stages in order to obtain a measure of (over)confidence and filled out an anxiety survey based on the State Anxiety Inventory.
In the second experiment, a preregistered replication of the first experiment was completed with 639 participants. In addition, a post-experimental survey was conducted to understand how opt-out framing increased women’s competition rates by assessing perceived norms of competition and perceived desirability of competition. 
In the third experiment, 477 freelancers (304 men and 173 women) were hired to complete a data entry job via Upwork. Compensation for the first stage was non-competitive, and all workers completed a “test project” with piece-rate compensation of $5 base compensation and $0.25 bonus commission to scrape data from as many companies as they could in 5 minutes. Before the second stage, freelancers were given the choice of performing a standard task identical in compensation and difficulty to that in the first stage, or to compete for a more advanced, higher-paying task ($7.50 base compensation with $1.00 bonus commission) in the third phase. They randomly assigned freelancers to opt in or opt out of competition. In the opt-in condition, freelancers were by default enrolled in the noncompetitive standard task for the third stage but had the option to apply instead to compete for the advanced task in the third stage by checking a box. For the opt-out condition, freelancers were by default enrolled in the competition for the advanced task but had the option to opt out of the competition and proceed instead to the standard task by checking a box. The second stage was identical to the first with piece-rate compensation, but for those who chose to compete for the advanced task in the third phase, their performance would also serve as their “application.” The top 25% performers from the second phase would be selected, while those who chose to compete but were not selected for the advanced task would not be invited back for a third phase at all, which was clearly communicated to the freelancers. Following the second stage, there was an evaluation by the research team to make selection decisions for the third phase. For the third stage, freelancers were invited back to the standard task (if they did not choose to compete during stage 2), the advanced task (if they had won the competition in stage 2), or no task at all (if they had chosen to compete but did not win the competition).